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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The sole issue for the Court to determine is whether the 
trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees and ruling that Rhoda Thurber, as the sole 
surviving co-settlor, co-trustee and active beneficiary, acted 
within the lawful scope of her authority without breaching any 
owed fiduciary duty by revoking the Trust established by 
Declaration of Trust dated April 1, 1980. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary 
judgment is a question of law, no deference is due the trial 
court' s determination of the issues presented." Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 p.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
"If two or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust, 
and if any of them is unable or refuses to accept the 
appointment, or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee, the 
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surviving or remaining trustees shall perform the trust and 
succeed to all the powers, duties, and discretionary authority 
given to the trustees jointly." Section 75-7-405(2) of the Utah 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This case is a dispute between the four named beneficiaries 
of the Declaration of Trust executed by Joseph W. Thurber and 
Rhoda Thurber on or about April 1, 1980. The corpus of that 
trust consisted of certain personal property identified within 
the trust document and the residence owned by the co-settlors. 
Subsequent to the execution of that trust, and following Joseph 
Thurber' s death, Rhoda Thurber, as the sole surviving co-settlor, 
joint trustee and active beneficiary unilaterally revoked the 
trust of April 1, 1980 by testamentary device and by the sale of 
the marital residence. This case, therefore, centers on the 
powers that a sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and active 
beneficiary may exercise over a trust. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellants commenced this action on September 4, 1997 by 
filing a Complaint in the Third District Court against Appellees. 
Thereafter, on or about February 28, 1998, Appellants filed their 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Appellees filed their 
Motion in Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on or 
about March 10, 1998. On August 28, 1998, the parties argued 
their respective motions before Judge Thorne. Subsequent to this 
hearing, on October 4, 1998, the trial court entered it Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees and denied Appellants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. On or about October 30, 199 8, 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about April 1, 1980, decedents Joseph W. Thurber 
and Rhoda Thurber, as co-settlors, executed a revocable 
Declaration of Trust naming themselves as joint trustees of the 
Trust corpus which consisted of certain personal property 
identified within the trust document and real property located at 
2480 Alden Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Appellants' First 
Addendum. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, the parties to this 
action were named as contingent beneficiaries subject to 
divestiture. Appellants' First Addendum, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4. 
3. Pursuant to the terms of this trust, the decedents 
reserved the right to revoke the trust, to encumber the trust 
assets, or to collect any income derived from the trust assets 
for their own use, thereby naming themselves as the primary 
active beneficiaries of the trust. No term of the trust document 
prevents the decedents from completely exhausting the trust 
corpus. Appellants' First Addendum, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
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4. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, "the sale or other 
disposition by us of the whole or any part of the property shall 
constitute as to such whole or part a revocation of this trust." 
Appellants First Addendum, paragraph 3. 
5. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the trust document, the 
surviving co-trustee succeeds to all of the powers, as sole 
trustee, exercisable by the joint trustees under the Declaration 
of Trust. Appellants' First Addendum, paragraph 5. 
6. Joseph Thurber predeceased Rhoda Thurber. (R.3). 
7. On or about December 16, 1985, Rhoda Thurber executed a 
Last Will and Testament. Pursuant to the terms of that 
instrument, Ms. Thurber revoked all "testamentary instruments 
which she had previously executed. 
8. On or about June 29, 1992, Ms. Thurber executed a 
subsequent Last Will and Testament. Pursuant to the terms of 
that document, Ms. Thurber revoked all other former "wills and 
codicils" which she had previously executed. At this time Ms. 
Thurber executed a second trust. 
9. On or about August 15, 1992, Ms. Thurber conveyed the 
real property in question to Holli and Robert Bezzant in exchange 
for monthly payments of $612.00 until the balance of the purchase 
price was paid in full. 
10. Ms. Thurber is now deceased. 
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11. Pursuant to the terms of the testamentary instruments 
executed subsequent to the 1980 Declaration of Trust, Appellees 
have received the proceeds from the property in question. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to the explicit terms of the Trust document and 
applicable law, decedents as co-settlors established themselves 
as joint trustees and sole active beneficiaries of the trust 
corpus. As such, settlors retained the right to revoke the trust 
and, as joint trustees, to encumber or otherwise utilize the 
trust assets for their primary benefit. Accordingly, although 
named as beneficiaries under the document, the actual rights of 
the decedents' children under the document could not be 
ascertained until the death of both co-settlors. As such, these 
children are only contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture 
and owed no fiduciary duty by either joint trustee. When Ms. 
Thurber, as the sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and 
active beneficiary acted to revoke the trust, she did so under 
the explicit authorization of the Trust document, and inasmuch as 
Appellants have no claim under the subsequent testamentary 
documents executed by Ms. Thurber, Appellants have no claim to 
the property in question. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, 
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ." West One 
Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah App. 1993). All 
of the relevant facts, as set forth above, were presented to the 
trial court which properly concluded that the terms of the trust 
permitted Ms. Thurber to revoke the trust following her husband' s 
death. However, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court even 
if it is one not relied on below." Hiqgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
II. INASMUCH AS MS. THURBER PROPERLY REVOKED THE 1980 
TRUST, APPELLANTS MAY NOT BASE ANY CLAIM TO PROPERTY ON THE 
1980 DECLARATION OF TRUST. 
Appellants' interest to the property in question stems 
solely from the 1980 Declaration of Trust. It is undisputed and 
Appellants do not argue, that subsequent to Joseph Thurber' s 
death, Rhoda Thurber as the sole surviving co-settlor and joint 
trustee acted to revoke this trust. The sole question before the 
Court is whether the statement within the Trust document which 
prevented a sole surviving co-settlor from changing the named 
beneficiaries also prevented the revocation of the trust itself. 
When viewed within the context of the entire trust document, it 
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becomes apparent, as the trial court rightfully concluded, that 
it does not. 
A. The trust clearly establishes that the decedents, rather 
than the named beneficiaries, were the sole active 
beneficiaries under the trust. 
" [T]rust provisions are not to be construed in the abstract, 
but rather must be viewed against the background of the entire 
document." Brenneman v. Bennett, 420 F.2d 19, 23 (8th Cir. 1970) 
(applying Iowa law) (emphasis added); accord Rubinson v. 
Rubinson, 620 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (111. App. 1993). Applying this 
axiomatic rule of construction to the instant case leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the 1980 Trust document did not 
prevent Rhoda Thurber from revoking the trust following her 
husband1 s death notwithstanding trust language which prevented 
Ms. Thurber from changing the beneficiaries within the existing 
trust. 
Viewed as a whole it is apparent that the 1980 trust served 
primarily as a testamentary device designed primarily to avoid 
the entanglements often associated with the probate process. As 
such under the explicit terms of the trust, the Thurbers, as co-
settlors, reserved and retained extensive and broad powers under 
the trust, not only to revoke the trust itself, but to utilize 
the trust corpus for their own benefit while they were still 
living. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of the document states 
unequivocally: "We reserve unto ourselves the power and right to 
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(a) place a mortgage or other lien upon the property, and (b) to 
collect any rental or other income which may accrue from the 
trust property and, in our sole discretion as Trustees, either to 
accumulate such income as an addition to the trust assets being 
held hereunder or pay such income to ourselves as individuals." -
Moreover, paragraph 3 explicitly authorizes the sale of the trust 
corpus and states that such sale serves as a revocation of the 
trust: "The sale or other disposition by us of the whole or any 
part of the property shall constitute as to such whole or part a 
revocation of this trust." From this language it is clear that 
the Thurbers in no way intended, by execution of the 1980 
document, to limit their control over the trust corpus. Rather, 
they explicitly retained every right which they possessed prior 
to such execution. As such, the Thurbers, rather than the named 
beneficiaries, stood as the sole active beneficiaries under the 
terms of the 1980 trust. 
B. The death of Joseph Thurber in no way impaired Ms. 
Thurber' s right to continue exercising broad powers over the 
trust corpus for her primary benefit while she continued to 
live. 
Contrary to assertions advanced by Appellants, no trust 
provision serves to limit Ms. Thurber' s status as the sole active 
beneficiary following her husband's death. Rather, Ms. Thurber 
succeeded to all the benefits she enjoyed prior to her husband' s 
death. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Matter of Estate of 
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West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), "It defies common sense that a 
couple creating a revocable inter vivos trust naming themselves 
as trustees would deliberately preclude themselves from fully 
utilizing the property for their own benefit while both or either 
one of them was alive, particularly when it appears that the 
purpose of the form book trust may have been simply to avoid 
probate." 
Moreover, in addition to succeeding to full beneficial 
status, Ms. Thurber succeeded to full legal status as well. 
Paragraph 5, reflecting section 75-7-402(2) of the Utah Code, 
explicitly states: "Upon the death or legal capacity of one of 
us, the survivor shall continue as sole Trustee." As such, any 
act which may have been lawfully exercised by the joint trustees 
prior to Mr. Thurber' s death, could now be exercised by Ms. 
Thurber unilaterally. As discussed above, since the trust 
granted the joint trustees broad powers to either sell or 
encumber the trust property, following Mr. Thurber' s death, Ms. 
Thurber retained this power solely without limitation and 
rightfully exercised this power in 1992 when she conveyed the 
trust realty. 
C. Any limitation imposed by the trust addendum applies 
only to powers related to the co-settlors and not to powers 
exercisable by a trustee. 
Appellants' argument that the trust addendum which provides 
that following the death of one of the co-settlors that the 
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beneficiaries cannot be changed has no bearing on whether a sole 
surviving trustee can convey realty and thereby terminate the 
trust with respect to that realty; the sale of trust property is 
a power exercisable only by a trustee while the naming of 
beneficiaries is a right solely exercisable by a settlor. 
Imposing a limitation on a sole surviving co-settlor with respect 
to naming beneficiaries in no way affects specific and explicit 
authority delegated to a trustee elsewhere within the trust, 
namely the right to sell or encumber trust property for the 
benefit of the sole surviving active beneficiary. Moreover, this 
limitation on the surviving co-settlor in no way impacts the 
consequences of the sale or other disposition of trust property. 
The trust explicitly states that such sale automatically revokes 
the trust with respect to that specific property. 
D. When viewed as whole, it is apparent that the trust 
document imposes no limitation on a surviving trustee to 
manage the property for the benefit of the sole surviving 
active beneficiary. 
When read in its entirety, it is apparent that the 1980 
document stands primarily as a testamentary device. As such the 
Thurbers as settlors, granted themselves extensive authority, as 
trustees, to manage the property for their own benefit, as 
primary active beneficiaries, while either one of them continued 
to live. Taken within this context, Ms. Thurber acted within her 
authority when she conveyed the property in 1992. And, inasmuch 
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as this sale served to revoke the trust with respect to this 
property, Appellants may not claim any interest in the proceeds 
derived from this property. 
III. APPELLANTS ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THIS CASE FROM WEST 
IS MISGUIDED. 
In Appellants' Brief, Appellants acknowledge that the Utah 
Supreme Court' s recent decision in Matter of Estate of West, 948 
P.2d 351 (Utah 1997) bears heavily on the current matter. In 
that case, the court found that a sole trustee who is also the 
sole active beneficiary of the trust could rightfully terminate 
the trust pursuant to the specific authorization granted in the 
trust document. In dicta, the Court also noted that Herschel 
West could have revoked the trust as a surviving co-settlor. Id. 
At 354. 
In determining that Herschel West acted within his authority 
to terminate the trust as a surviving co-trustee, the Court 
followed a three prong analysis. First, the Court looked to 
determine whether the trust document authorized the trustees to 
revoke the trust. Second, the Court looked to determine whether 
a surviving co-trustee succeeded to all of the powers held by the 
joint trustees. Third, the Court looked to determine if a 
trustee' s revocation of the trust violated any fiduciary duty 
owed to the named beneficiaries. Id. at 353-54. 
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After determining that the trust document specifically 
authorized a trustee to revoke the trust and that a surviving 
trustee succeeded to all of the powers held by the joint 
trustees, the Court found that Herschel West did not violate any 
fiduciary duty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made a 
distinction between active and contingent beneficiaries. "The 
active beneficiaries of a trust, as distinct from the contingent 
beneficiaries, are the individuals for whose benefit and support 
the property is presently being managed." .Id. at 355. By this 
definition, the Court readily accepted that the settlor/trustee 
in that revocable trust setting constituted the active 
beneficiary. Evidence of that intent was found in the fact that 
the settlor/trustee retained exclusive control to manage the 
property as he saw fit without distributing any income to a named 
beneficiary. 
Finally, the Court noted that the trust property would not 
be distributed until the death of the surviving trustee at which 
time the trust corpus may have been exhausted. Since the 
children' s rights did not ripen until the death of the surviving 
settlor/trustee, the children' s were subject to divestiture until 
that time. Thus, the Court found that Herschel West was the sole 
active beneficiary of the trust, and as such, Herschel West could 
terminate the trust as a trustee without violating any fiduciary 
duty to a named beneficiary. 
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In the present case, the same three pronged analysis 
employed by the Utah Supreme Court in West, indicates that Rhoda 
Thurber acted within her authority to terminate the trust. 
First, the trust document specifically authorizes the settlor or 
the trustee to revoke or terminate the trust. See Paragraph 3 of 
the trust document. Second, Rhoda Thurber, as surviving trustee, 
succeeded to all of the authority held by the joint trustees. 
See Paragraph 5 of the trust document, Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-7-
405(2) and West, supra. Third, as the sole active beneficiary of 
the trust, Rhoda Thurber, as trustee, violated no fiduciary duty 
by terminating the trust. 
Appellants apparently concede that the present case meets 
the first prong of the analysis. Appellants however, contend 
that each of the named beneficiaries became active beneficiaries 
at the trust's inception and that Ms. Thurber did not succeed to 
all authority exercisable by the joint trustees. Appellants base 
this distinction on differences which they claim that exist in 
the language of the two trust document. A plain reading of the 
two documents indicates that this distinction does not affect the 
operation of the two documents. 
A, No language in the trust document prevents Ms. Thurber 
from succeeding to all powers held by both joint trustees. 
As addressed above, Appellants' contention that the trust 
addendum prevented Ms. Thurber from succeeding to all powers held 
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by both joint trustees is unfounded. First, paragraph 5 
explicitly states that the surviving trustee does in fact succeed 
to all authority held by both joint trustees. Second, inasmuch 
as no section of the trust ever authorized the joint trustees to 
change beneficiaries, Ms. Thurber as sole surviving trustee could 
never exercise this right and the addendum therefore places no 
limitation on powers exercisable by a trustee. Rather, any % 
limitation imposed by the addendum simply limits authority 
exercisable by a surviving co-settlor, and inasmuch as a co-
settlor never had any authority to sell property this addendum 
does not address any issue before the Court today; whether a sole 
surviving co-trustee succeeds to all powers properly exercisable 
by joint trustees. 
B. The children' s rights under the trust did not become 
vested until the death of the final settlor/trustee. Until 
that time the children were owed no fiduciary duty. 
In their brief, Appellants quote the language from the 
respective trust documents which they feel distinguishes West 
from the present case. Appellants emphasize that the Thurber 
document does not contain the statement "on the death of the 
survivor of us" which exists in the West document in the 
paragraph before the contingent beneficiaries are named. From 
this distinction, Appellants state: "In short in West 'the trust 
instrument was clear that the children would not become 
beneficiaries until the death of the survivor of the two 
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settlors.' Conversely, in the case at bar the trust instrument 
is clear that Plaintiffs became beneficiaries on the date of its 
execution, April 1, 1980." Appellants' Brief, p. 9. 
Appellants' distinction has two serious flaws: one textual 
and one rational. The textual flaw lies in Appellants' assertion 
that the Thurber trust lacks the phrase, "on the death of the 
survivor of us," in the granting language. This is not true. 
The very next sentence of the trust following the named 
beneficiaries begins "Upon the death of the survivor of us,...our 
Successor Trustee is hereby directed forthwith to transfer said 
property and all right, title and interest to the beneficiaries." 
Thus, the textual distinction simply does not exist. 
The rational flaw lies in Appellants' failure to follow the 
West Court' s rationale in designating the named beneficiaries as 
contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture. Appellees do 
not dispute that Appellants became beneficiaries on April 1, 
1980. Appellees only argue that until the death of Ms. Thurber, 
the parties were only contingent beneficiaries subject to 
divestiture. Appellants have ignored the West analysis entirely. 
Since Ms. Thurber retained the right to receive income and manage 
the trust property for her own benefit and terminate the trust at 
her will, the possibility existed that Ms. Thurber could 
completely exhaust the trust corpus notwithstanding her right to 
revoke the trust. Therefore, Ms. Thurber remained the sole 
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active beneficiary under the trust. Appellants' , and indeed 
Appellees' , rights under the trust did not vest until Ms. Thurber 
died. Before that time, both parties' rights were wholly subject 
to divestiture and indeed, when Ms. Thurber acted to revoke the 
trust, all parties lost their status as benficiaries under that 
trust. As the sole active beneficiary and the sole trustee, Ms. 
Thurber did not violate any fiduciary duty by terminating the 
trust and extinguishing Plaintiffs' rights under the trust. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellees respectfully request this 
Court to affirm the trial court' s ruling and find that pursuant 
to the explicit terms of the Trust document and applicable law, 
decedents as co-settlors established themselves as joint trustees 
and sole active beneficiaries of the trust corpus. As such, 
settlors retained the right to revoke the trust and, as joint 
trustees, to encumber or otherwise utilize the trust assets for 
their primary benefit. Accordingly, although named as 
beneficiaries under the document, the actual rights of the 
decedents' children under the document could not be ascertained 
until the death of both co-settlors. As such, these children are 
only contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture and owed no 
fiduciary duty by either joint trustee. When Ms. Thurber, as the 
sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and active beneficiary 
acted to revoke the trust, she did so under the explicit 
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authorization of the Trust document, and inasmuch as Appellants 
have no claim under the subsequent testamentary documents 
executed by Ms. Thurber, Appellants have no claim to the property 
in question. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. ^ IL~ 
RESPECTIVELY submitted this / day of December, 1999. 
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